

TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF CHESS

2 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT : Handling of Intelligence Information during
the Cuban Arms Build-up**

**REFERENCE : (a) Inspector General's Survey, dated 20
November 1962, subject: same
SC 11723-62/KH**

**(b) Memorandum for DDCI from DD/R,
dated 15 December 1962, subject: same
SC-12583-62-KH**

Your memorandum of 11 December 1962 transmitting reference (a) requested that addressees submit recommendations for actions within CIA to improve the collection, reporting and analysis of intelligence information. The following points are perhaps worthy of note in this connection; in some cases, actions to accomplish these have already been taken or are in progress.

a. The views of senior Agency officials with the reasons for these views should be transmitted down the Agency chain of command to juniors who have to participate in working-level committee activities, not so they will have a pre-ordained position, but so that they will be in the most knowledgeable position in developing committee action. The particular case in point was the failure of the Agency representatives associated with COMOR to be aware of the DCI's views on the Cuban build-up, and particularly the reasons for his misgivings. It is not enough to have these ideas floating around at top level. Those individuals who must work on these committees are generating the basic paper from which most of the detailed actions follow. As long as there is an intelligence community and the DCI is responsible for co-ordination, it is important

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that the committee structure be the best that can be provided. It is not a satisfactory solution to override or undercut these committees at senior level, and frequently an inadequate action will result as it did in the classic case of the Cuban missile build-up.

b. Too often in the past the Agency has relied on oral conversations to provide a basis for actions or inaction. While elaborate paper work is to be deplored, and this past procedure has resulted in much more timely reaction than is the normal case in the Government, I think we have learned the lesson that at a minimum Memoranda for the Record should be prepared and disseminated to those who have a need-to-know. Too often in the Cuban situation, we were faced with difficulties in reconstructing the reasons for actions and perhaps, even more dangerously, with the fact that individuals had interpreted results of meetings or conversations quite differently. As a corollary to this, it is also extremely important that we make a matter of record our requests or desires to carry out a given operation even though the chance of its being approved is slight.

c. The Cuban crisis did, and to some extent continues to, point up the rather wide-spread Agency activity in the field of air defense. OSI has responsibility for the technical aspects of air defense systems; ORR for the production and continuing deployment status; OCI for day-to-day news on events involving air defense; and OSA/DD/R for air defense activities which might affect its operations. Since these lines are sometimes overlapping and often fuzzy, this has led to some confusion in high quarters as to who should provide desired information and also to different answers depending on the information available to the component queried. We have recently gotten together all of the interested parties in this area, and I hope perhaps made some progress toward clarifying the situation.

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

**Deputy Director
(Research)**

cc: Exec Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000100110294-8

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